

17
Tempora Mutantur ;

OR,

REASONS FOR THINKING

THAT IT IS

INCONSISTENT WITH THE WELFARE
OF THIS KINGDOM,

To persist in withholding from the

Roman Catholics,

The Political Power, Offices and Honors
Exclusively enjoyed by

Protestants ;

AND,

That the Admission of the ROMAN CATHOLICS,
To a suitable Participation of these,
Would not render them predominant

IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM,

Nor consequently be followed

BY THOSE PERNICIOUS EFFECTS

Which are generally apprehended.

*Il y dans les meilleurs conseils de quoi déplaire : ils viennent
d'ailleurs que de notre esprit, c'est assez pour etre re-
jettis d'abord par presumption & par humeur ; & suivis
seulement par necessité ou par reflexion. LA BRYERE.*

DUBLIN:

PRINTED BY J. MOORE, 45, COLLEGE-GREEN.

1799.

REASONS for THINKING,

©c. ©c.

WITHOUT stopping to enquire whether the prohibitions and disqualifications, under which the *Roman Catholics* of this kingdom formerly laboured, were expedient or impolitic; or whether the manner in which these were removed was calculated to *extinguish*, or to *perpetuate* religious jealousy and discord; in short, without misemploying my time in any unseasonable, superfluous or invidious research whatsoever, I shall hasten to lay before my Protestant fellow-subjects, those reasons which have disposed me to think, *that it is inconsistent with the welfare of this kingdom, to persist in withholding from the Catholics the political power, offices and honours still exclusively enjoyed by Protestants—and that the admission of the Catholics to a suitable participation of these would not render them predominant in the political system, nor consequently be followed by those pernicious effects which are generally apprehended.*

The constituent parts of the welfare of a Nation are, *internal tranquillity, liberty, opulence and independence.*

That the *internal tranquillity* of this kingdom must be extremely precarious, so long as *Catholic exclusion*

A

shall

shall continue, seems to me to admit of little dispute. It cannot, I think, be expected, by any person acquainted with human nature, that the Noblemen, Gentlemen, and wealthy Merchants amongst the *Catholics*, however appearances may bespeak the contrary, will *ever* be reconciled to the existing monopoly of political power, offices and honours. The pride of some must be thereby necessarily outraged, and the envy of others, necessarily excited and consequently dissatisfaction *must* be prevalent amongst them. Much less can it be expected that enterprizing Catholics of moderate properties, endowed by nature and education with all the qualities requisite to the attainment of conspicuity in the political world, will patiently acquiesce in the exclusion of their patrons and kinsmen from political power, and its concomitant opportunities of gratifying *their*, ambition and improving *their* fortunes.

And as to the lower class of Catholics, it is natural to presume, that their conduct will with little variation be subservient to the views and interests of the more opulent and enterprizing of their communion. Thus then, I think, there are sufficient grounds for suspecting, that so long as political power shall be withheld from the Catholics, there will be, as the late Mr. Burke said, "*a Bank of discontent in this kingdom, accumulating every hour, and on which every description of seditious persons may draw at pleasure.*" The individuals of the higher orders of the Catholics, according to the peculiarities of their several dispositions and circumstances, will either be disposed to revolt openly, to foment Rebellion clandestinely, or to observe a disloyal neutrality. Every avenue to preferment and wealth being closed, enterprizing Catholics will readily engage in any project whatsoever, tending to the annihilation of the present illiberal *system of exclusion*. And the lower orders of Catholics will be perpetually kept

kept in a dangerous state of alienation from the Government of this kingdom. *Facies non omnibus una, nec diversa tamen.*

Internal disturbances are manifestly preclusive of the enjoyment of *liberty*. While civil dissensions prevail, justice is never uniformly administered with scrupulous impartiality. And when such dissensions burst forth into commotions, persons, properties and lives become no longer secure. If then *Catholic exclusion* be unfavourable to *internal tranquillity*, it must, mediately, be so, to *civil liberty*. But though the internal tranquillity of this kingdom were to remain undisturbed, yet *liberty* can never, in my opinion, flourish under the present system of political exclusion; because, in order to prevent the operation of obvious causes of internal convulsions, such system must be invariably accompanied by defensive measures, altogether incongenial with the recognized principles of civil liberty.

Internal disturbances, likewise, impede the increase of *national opulence*. Countries, in which existing circumstances afford a prospect of civil commotions, are neither the proper nurseries, nor proper abodes of industrious traders and manufacturers. In such countries, a spirit of *political* enterprise will always be more common than a spirit of *commercial* enterprise. Capitals will be but rarely accumulated, and seldom beneficially employed, and physical advantages left comparatively neglected.

Both *internal tranquillity* and *opulence* are confessedly necessary to the preservation of *national independence*. A poor, distracted, paralysed nation, especially if situated in the neighbourhood of a united and opulent one, cannot long preserve its independence. As for this kingdom, if the Protestants, on one hand, tenaciously withhold political power from the Catholics,

and these, on the other, pursue it with redoubled ardour, as there is ample reason to suspect they will, (*nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negatum*) the former, I am persuaded, finally perceiving their inability to contend against consolidated multitudes, irritated, alienated, and rendered *unappeasable*, will resort to a humiliating legislative Union with England, as the only remaining expedient by which they may hope to escape vindictive retaliation.

Having thus briefly assigned my reasons for thinking that *Catholic exclusion* is inconsistent with the welfare of this kingdom, inasmuch as it militates against each of its constituent parts, *internal tranquillity, liberty, opulence and independence*, I shall proceed to offer those reasons which incline me to think that the admission of the Catholics to a suitable participation of the political power, offices and honours actually engrossed by the Protestants, would not render the former predominant in the political system; nor consequently be followed by those pernicious effects which are generally apprehended.

That *political power naturally follows the balance of property in land*, is a truth discovered and established by Harrington, received by several eminent political writers of the present century, and warmly assented to by the sagacious President of the United States of America, in his History of Republics.

If then it be true that *political power follows the balance of property in land*, the Protestants of this kingdom, in whose favour such balance obviously is in a most disproportionate degree, must in a similar degree, necessarily preponderate in the Legislature, after the admission of the Catholics. Nor can the Protestants be despoiled of this balance of property by any other means than a general and successful insurrection on the part of the Catholics; which, for reasons already given

7
given, is much more likely to be caused by their *exclusion* from, than their *admission* into, the Legislature.

Perhaps there never was hatched in the brain of a timid visionary, a more extravagant absurdity than the opinion which is current amongst many, namely, that the admission of the Catholics into the Legislature would endanger the properties of the Protestants. How is it possible that the repeal of a law, having for its object the despoliation of the Protestant proprietors of the soil, could take place in an assembly, 4-5ths of the members whereof were of this description? On the other hand, suppose by purchase, marriage, or bequest, the Catholics, (which is extremely improbable) were to acquire, in the lapse of time, the *balance of property in land*, and thereby eventually obtain that predominance in the political system, which the Protestants actually possess, is it reasonable to apprehend, that for the malevolent purpose of dispossessing an inconsiderable number of Protestant landlords, they would repeal laws, whereby their own possessions, derived from Protestants, were secured?

Circumstanced as property is at present in this kingdom, I am persuaded that not more, (perhaps not so many,) as *ten* Catholics would be chosen for counties, and about twice that number for boroughs. Roman Catholics holding profitable, terminable leases under Protestants, certainly would not (as indeed experience has already proved) rashly gratify their own wishes in opposition to those of their landlords. And I cannot think that the greater *Borough patrons*, as they are called, would abridge their political power, for a trifling transitory augmentation of their wealth.

If then it be highly probable that not more than *thirty* Catholics could procure seats in the lower house, what danger, I ask, could possibly result from allowing them to participate with Protestants the right of legislation?

legislation? What danger, *under any circumstances whatsoever*, could possibly result from the commixture of *thirty* Catholic with TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY Protestant Representatives? But can it be supposed that those Catholics, who might now, on *justifiable* grounds, be hostile to the existing establishments, would be so far after their admission into the Legislature? Can it be supposed that for the specific purpose of subverting any one of these establishments, they would form themselves into an impenetrable faction, and thus, not only virtually exclude themselves from those honours, offices and emoluments, which, it is more than probable, are actually their chief incentives to seek for seats in Parliament; but take the most effectual step to alarm and unite the Protestants, and drive them to avail themselves of their predominance in the Legislature, by *re-enacting* the present disqualifying statutes? Is it not rather more natural, more agreeable to the suggestions of common sense, does it not manifest a superior knowledge of human nature, to presume that their individual parliamentary conduct would, for the most part, be governed by those various motives by which other individuals have hitherto been governed?

There are many who think that the Catholics would not be satisfied with being admitted into the Legislature, unless their admission was followed by a reform in the lower House. Whether they would or would not be satisfied with the former, unaccompanied by the latter, I shall not take upon me to say. But this I will venture to say, that if it be true, that *political power follows the balance of property in land*, there is no measure which the Catholics should deprecate more earnestly, and resist more strenuously, than an abolition of boroughs; because such a measure would obviously be tantamount to an exclusion of all their

their monied or commercial men, consequently greatly reduce their number. At all events the Catholics, *as such*, must be conciliated by being admitted to share the right of legislation, and all offices and honours, with the Protestants; and, as *Roman Catholics*, could not possibly be irritated by an opposition to Parliamentary Reform; the grounds of such opposition being extremely dissimilar from those of an opposition to their present claims.

Others are averse to admitting the Catholics into the Legislature, under a persuasion that their admission would be followed, at no great distance, by a Separation of this kingdom from Great Britain. Granting that the Catholics were inimical to the subsisting Connexion between the Sister Kingdoms, of which, however, no substantial proof exists, they could not effect its dissolution until they acquired a predominance in the Legislature. But this, as was before shewn, they could not acquire, until they attained the balance of property in land: which with every circumstance in their favour and against the Protestants, they could not attain, perhaps before the expiration of the approaching century: when, it is extremely likely, the political aspect of Europe will be entirely changed—existing connexions, alliances and fæderations annulled or commuted—and religion and politics disunited for ever.

Others again say that the downfall of the Protestant Church must inevitably follow the admission of the Catholics into the legislature. But it has already been shewn that the Catholics, acting in a body in Parliament, must necessarily be overpowered by the Protestants. How then can the Church of the latter be overthrown? And here it may not be amiss to observe, that as religious toleration has become prevalent throughout Europe, and most assuredly

redly will continue to be so, and as experience has evinced that a *tolerated* religion, under the superintendence of a *needy* Priesthood, always gains ground on an established one, under the superintendence of a *wealthy* Priesthood, no enlightened lay Catholic, zealously and conscientiously attached to his religion, could wish to see its ministers in the dangerous enjoyment of the *inertifying* revenues of an established Church.

If then it shall appear to others as it does to me, that the actual exclusion of the Catholics from political power is inconsistent with the welfare of this Kingdom; and that those pernicious effects, which are generally expected to result from their admission into the legislature, are either imaginary, or much more likely to ensue from their *exclusion*, than their *admission*; and if Parliament shall in consequence think it expedient to extend to them the right of Legislation, I trust that in conferring this last favour, they will conform more strictly than heretofore to *Seneca's* advice. "Give, as you would receive, cheerfully and without hesitation."



THE END